Old BSD bug: While ^ is recognized and the set of matching characters
is negated, the code neglects to increment the pointer pointing to the
matching characters. Thus, on a negation expression like %[^xyz], the
matching doesn't only stop at x, y, or z, but incorrectly also on ^.
Fix this by setting the start pointer after recognizing the ^.
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
The following functions are also guarded in glibc:
fwprintf, swprintf, wprintf, vfwprintf, vswprintf, vwprintf.
Signed-off-by: Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com>
* vfscanf: per POSIX, if the target type is wchar_t, the width is
counted in (multibyte) characters, not in bytes.
* vfscanf: Handle UTF-8 multibyte sequences converted to surrogate
pairs on UTF-16 systems.
* vfwscanf: Don't count high surrogates in input against field width
counting. Per POSIX, input is
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
The width value keeps the maximum field width. This is the maximum
field width of the *input*. It's *never* to be used in conjunction
with the number of bytes or characters written to the output argument.
However, especially in vfwscanf, the code is partially taken from
NetBSD which erroneously subtracts the number of multibyte chars
written to the argument from the width variable, thus potentially
subtracting up to MB_CUR_MAX from width for a single character in
the input stream.
To make matters worse, the previous patch adding %m added basically
the same mistake for 'c' type input.
Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
* The new code is guarded with _WANT_IO_POSIX_EXTENSIONS, but
this is automatically enabled with _WANT_IO_C99_FORMATS for now.
* vfscanf neglects to implement %l[, so %ml[ is not implemented yet
either.
* Sidenote: vfwscanf doesn't allow ranges in %[ yet. Strictly this
is allowed per POSIX, but it differes from vfscanf as well as from
glibc.
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <corinna@vinschen.de>
The implementation is from NetBSD, with the addition of feature test macros
for readlink. glibc also wraps the following functions:
confstr, getdomainname, getgroups, gethostname, getlogin_r, getwd, pread,
readlinkat, ttyname_r.
Signed-off-by: Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com>
The implementation is mostly from NetBSD, except for switching fgets to
pure inline, and the addition of fgets_unlocked, fread, and fread_unlocked
for parity with glibc. The following functions are also guarded in glibc:
asprintf, dprintf, fprintf, printf, vasprintf, vdprintf, vfprintf, vprintf.
Signed-off-by: Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com>
The implementation is from NetBSD, with the addition of mempcpy (a GNU
extension) for parity with glibc and libssp.
Signed-off-by: Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com>
The Object Size Checking (-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=*) functionality provides
wrappers around functions suspectible to buffer overflows. While
independent from Stack Smashing Protection (-fstack-protector*), they
are often used and implemented together.
While GCC also provides an implementation in libssp, it is completely
broken (CVE-2016-4973, RHBZ#1324759) and seemingly unfixable, as there
is no reliable way for a preprocessor macro to trigger a link flag.
Therefore, adding this here is necessary to make it work.
Note that this does require building gcc with --disable-libssp and
gcc_cv_libc_provides_ssp=yes.
Signed-off-by: Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com>
Compiling with any of the -fstack-protector* flags requires the
__stack_chk_guard data import (which needs to be initialized) and the
__stack_chk_fail{,_local} functions. While GCC's own libssp can provide
these, it is better that we provide these ourselves. The implementation
is custom due to being OS-specific.
Signed-off-by: Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com>
